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ABSTRACT 
Nano artifact metrics exploit unique physical attributes of nanostructured matter for 
authentication and clone resistance, which is vitally important in the age of Internet-of-
Things where securing identities is critical. However, high-cost and huge experimental 
apparatuses, such as scanning electron microscopy, have been required in the former 
studies. Herein, we demonstrate an optical approach to characterise the nanoscale-
precision signatures of silicon random structures towards realising low-cost and high-value 
information security technology. Unique and versatile silicon nanostructures are generated 
via resist collapse phenomena, which contains dimensions that are well below the 
diffraction limit of light. We exploit the nanoscale precision ability of confocal laser 
microscopy in the height dimension, and our experimental results demonstrate that the 
vertical precision of measurement is essential in satisfying the performances required for 
artifact metrics. Furthermore, by using state-of-the-art nanostructuring technology, we 
experimentally fabricate clones from the genuine devices. We demonstrate that the 
statistical properties of the genuine and clone devices are successfully exploited, showing 
that the liveness-detection-type approach, which is widely deployed in biometrics, is valid 
in artificially-constructed solid-state nanostructures. These findings pave the way for 
reasonable and yet sufficiently secure novel principles for information security based on 
silicon random nanostructures and optical technologies. 
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Introduction 
Artifact metrics1, also known as physical unclonable functions (PUFs)2, use the unique physical 
properties of ubiquitous materials to improve the information security of devices3; this is 
increasingly important as society enters the age of the Internet of Things4. Artifact metrics are 
based on optical, magnetic, electrical and mechanical properties associated with objects such as 
ordinary paper5,6, magnetic microfibers7, plastics and semiconductor chips8. As the number of 
cloning attacks increases, nano-artifact metrics are growing in importance because they exploit 
physically uncontrollable processes at the nanoscale. Such techniques are beyond the present 
roadmap of nanostructuring technologies9, 10. In [9], we proposed the concept of nano-artifact 
metrics and experimentally demonstrated the principle by fabricating silicon random 
nanostructures, which we measured using critical dimension scanning electron microscopy (CD-
SEM). 
In particular, we use electron-beam (e-beam) lithography to induce the random collapse 
of photoresists. Resist collapse occurs during the rinsing step of lithography, and it depends on 
the pattern resolution, resist thickness and duration of e-beam exposure11. This leads to the 
collapse of the intended pattern; the resulting minimum dimensions are smaller than the 
foreseeable limitations of nanofabrication technologies. In other words, physical randomness on 
the nanoscale, which has conventionally hindered nanostructuring, provides considerable 
benefits from the perspective of security. This fundamental principle was demonstrated by 
evaluating the false match rate (FMR) for verifying identities, false non-match rate (FNMR) for 
characterising the stability of measurements and the clone-match rate for evaluating the difficulty 
of making clones9. The potential capacity for making unique identities from nanoscale 
morphologies has been examined theoretically on the basis of eigenanalysis methods12. 
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The technology demonstrated so far, however, is difficult to deploy commercially 
because it requires high-cost equipment with the vacuum environment needed to perform SEM. 
Although desktop SEMs are currently available13, the limited operating environments, including 
safety, hinder their massive deployment.  
Optical microscopy suffers from fundamental spatial-resolution limits due to the 
diffraction of light; thus, performance comparable to an SEM cannot be achieved. However, 
confocal laser microscopy provides nanoscale resolution in the height dimension, although 
lateral resolution is limited14. Practical optical solutions can be expected if the unique features of 
a three-dimensional (3D) nanostructure pattern are retrievable via conventional confocal laser 
microscopy and retain sufficiently secure performance, including authentication and clone 
resistance. 
Herein, we use a conventional confocal microscope to retrieve the patterns of 100 unique, 
genuine devices comprising silicon random nanostructures. The FMR and FNMR of the genuine 
devices are investigated as a function of the threshold value for various levels of precision in the 
height measurements. Nanoscale precision on the order of 1–10 nm in the vertical direction, 
afforded by confocal microscopy, is essential for obtaining values of the FMR and FNMR that 
are useful for information security. Five clone devices were fabricated based on original devices 
and examined using confocal microscopy. Clone resistance was achieved by observing the 
differences between the height distributions of genuine and clone devices as well as noting a 
distinct threshold between the error rates of detecting genuine devices and the error rates of 
detecting clone devices. These results indicate that confocal microscopy is a compatible 
measurement technique for the secure identification of silicon random nanostructures. The ease 
 5
of device fabrication and high-throughput rate of characterisation suggest that this is a promising 
security technology. 
Results and Discussion 
The schematic of the basic architecture of the proposed system is illustrated in Fig. 1a. The 
random silicon nanostructures were fabricated from an array of pillars, as shown schematically in 
Fig. 1b. Each pillar had a cross-sectional area of 100 nm × 100 nm and a height of 100 nm; they 
were positioned on a 200 nm × 200 nm square grid that filled a 20 m × 20 m square area. To 
facilitate alignment, a 30 m × 30 m square frame and an alignment mark were drawn outside 
the pillar-array area. We used an e-beam lithography system (JEOL JBX-9300FS) with a 100-kV 
acceleration voltage. The rinsing step induced the random collapse of resist pillars. The resulting 
pattern was captured by CD-SEM (Hitachi High-Technologies CG4000) and the random 
structures are shown in Fig. 1c. We constructed 100 unique devices on a single wafer using these 
pillar-array structures. 
The fabricated patterns were observed with a confocal laser microscope (Olympus Inc. 
LEXT OLS400). This step corresponds to the ‘ScanA’ stage in Fig. 1a; an example image is 
shown in Fig. 1d. An area of 126 × 126 pixels at the centre of the device was extracted; each 
pixel corresponded to a square area that was 125 nm on a side (~15 m2). The original data was 
recorded during the process ‘ScanR’ in Fig. 1a, which became the template for the decision 
process used during authentication. 
During the ‘Decision’ process in Fig. 1a, we used the statistical properties of the optical 
height measurements of a genuine device to detect and reject clone devices. As shown in Fig. 1d, 
the pattern of a genuine device contained a large amount of height information. We cloned the 
patterns of original devices using state-of-the-art, silicon-nanostructure technologies. As a result, 
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the statistical properties of the optical measurements of clones differed significantly from those 
of genuine devices, as we demonstrate later below. This approach is similar to the liveness 
detection utilised in biometrics15. 
If an optical measurement, which we denote by ( , )A i j , passes through the initial screening 
process stated above, we calculate the correlations between the device under study and the 
template stored in the system, denoted ( , )B i j , based on the Pearson correlation coefficient: 
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where A  and B  are the averages of ( , )A i j  and ( , )B i j , respectively. Moreover, the image is 
shifted between one and three pixels to the upper, lower, left and right sides; R is calculated for 
each shifted position. The maximum value of R from these positions is used to quantify the 
similarity between ( , )A i j  and ( , )B i j . 
Based on R, the FMR and FNMR are evaluated as indicators of individuality and 
measurement stability, respectively. All 100 devices are used to calculate the FMR. If the 
similarity value given by Eq. (1) is greater than a given threshold, the two images are presumed 
to be the same, which is false. To evaluate the FNMR, each of the 100 samples is measured 10 
times. If the similarity between two observations of the same sample is smaller than a given 
threshold, the two images are considered to be different devices, which is false. The solid blue 
curve in Fig. 2 shows the FMR, which remains small even at low values of the threshold around 
0.1. The solid red curve depicts the FNMR, which increases with the threshold for values larger 
 7
than 0.5. These results indicate that it is possible to obtain sufficiently small values of the FMR 
and FNMR by choosing an appropriate threshold. 
We further evaluate the FMR and FNMR by intentionally degrading the resolution of the 
height measurements. Specifically, the measurement data is rounded off at the 1-nm, 10-nm and 
100-nm levels of precision and the resulting FMR are represented by the dotted, dashed and dot-
dashed curves, respectively, in Fig. 2 (the same depictions are also used for the FNMR). The 
performance of 1-nm- and 10-nm-resolution measurements nearly overlaps with the original 
data, whereas the 100-nm-resolution measurement deviates from the original; in particular, the 
FNMR is significantly degraded. This result confirms that the security performance of this 
technique derives from the nanoscale height characteristics of the silicon random nanostructures. 
Attackers can perform optical measurements on the genuine devices, so we fabricate five 
different kinds of clone devices based on their parent devices and examine the possibilities of 
detecting and rejecting cloning attacks. The experimental process of clone fabrication is as 
follows: Based on measurements obtained from the confocal microscope, we design the structure 
for the clone device. Binary-level height data may be used for most of the clone devices; in some 
instances, multiple height levels may be used. This degree of accuracy is reasonable given the 
nanostructure technologies that will be accessible to attackers in the foreseeable future 
concerning especially the fact that fabricating multiple-level nanostructures containing complex 
morphology is extremely difficult in so-called grey-scale e-beam lithography16,17 and 
multiexposure methods18. In this study, we binarise the measurement data and fabricate binary-
level patterns using e-beam lithography; then we use atomic force microscopy (AFM) to confirm 
that the fabrication is successful. We used an Olympus OLS3500 atomic force microscope to 
examine the surface profiles of the fabricated clones using a high-aspect ratio tip cantilever with 
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a half-tip angle of 6° (Olympus OLCL-AC160BN-A2) and a lateral resolution of 39 nm. An 
AFM image of a fabricated clone device and its laser microscopy image are shown in Figs. 3a 
and 3b, respectively. About a quarter of the whole area of the device is depicted in Figs. 3a and 
3b for the sake of presenting a magnified top-down view of the structures. Figure 3a confirms 
that the binary-level surface profile of the clone is executed precisely. Figure 3b shows that the 
optical measurement retrieves the surface profile of the clone. It is noteworthy that the optical 
height measurements do not exhibit binary levels, which may be attributed to diffraction and 
scattering induced by laser microscopy. We find that the statistical distributions of height vary 
considerably for genuine and clone devices. Genuine devices exhibit a Gaussian-like distribution 
(Fig. 3c), whereas clones exhibit skewed statistics (Fig. 3d); this property can be exploited for 
detecting clones. 
We evaluate similarities between the height distributions using Eq. (1) and replacing 
( , )A i j  and ( , )B i j  with ( )AH i  and ( )BH i , respectively, where ( )AH i  and ( )BH i  are the height 
histograms of ( , )A i j  and ( , )B i j , respectively. If both ( )AH i  and ( )BH i  originate from genuine 
devices, the similarity must be larger than a certain threshold to indicate that both belong to the 
same category (genuine device); this means that the inspection is successful (no error). On the 
other hand, if either ( )AH i  or ( )BH i  originates from a clone device, the calculated value of the 
similarity is smaller, indicating the detection of a clone. The solid blue curve in Fig. 3e shows the 
error ratio for the similarities between the 100 different genuine devices; the dashed red curve 
depicts the error ratio between the five clone devices and the 100 genuine devices. Notably, the 
former and the latter curves cluster on the left (less than 0.2) and right (greater than 0.27), 
respectively; thus, the detection of clones is possible by setting the threshold to be an 
intermediate value. 
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In conclusion, we experimentally demonstrate an optical approach for using the unique 
nanoscale fingerprints of silicon random structures to realise low-cost nano-artifact metrics 
produced in a vacuum-free environment. Specifically, we experimentally validate that 
conventional confocal laser microscopy can perform precise, nanoscale measurements that 
accommodate the individuality and measurement stability of silicon random nanostructures. We 
experimentally fabricate clone devices based on parent devices and show that clone resistance 
can be achieved by inspecting the statistical attributes of the genuine and clone devices; this 
demonstrates that the liveness-detection-type approach, which has been successfully employed in 
biometrics, is validated in artificially-constructed solid-state nanostructured devices.  
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Figure legends 
Figure 1. Architecture for optical nano-artifact metrics based on silicon random 
nanostructures. (a) Fundamental system architecture of nano-artifact metrics comprising 
optical measurements and decision processes. Conventional confocal laser microscopy is 
employed to exploit its nanoscale height resolution as well as to utilise the intrinsic 
attributes of silicon random nanostructures. (b) Schematic of an original array of pillars 
prior to its intentional collapse during the rinsing step of e-beam lithography; the 
collapsed array is a versatile, three-dimensional (3D) nanostructure. (c) SEM image of a 
fabricated silicon nanostructure. (d) Confocal laser microscope image of the device 
obtained with lateral resolution of 125 nm and nanoscale height resolution. 
 
Figure 2. Evaluation of security performance. False match rate (FMR) and false non-match 
rate (FNMR) as a function of threshold; they are evaluated to verify device individuality 
and measurement stability, respectively. The FMR and FNMR are also calculated while 
intentionally degrading the height resolution by rounding the original data in 1-nm, 10-
nm and 100-nm levels of precision; the result confirms that nanoscale information is 
responsible for the security performance of the devices. 
 
Figure 3. Clone rejection. Based on the optical measurements of genuine devices, we 
experimentally fabricate clone devices using e-beam lithography. (a) AFM image and (b) 
Confocal microscopy image of a fabricated clone device. The statistical characteristics of 
optically acquired height information for (c) genuine and (d) clone devices. (e) Clone 
 13
rejection can be achieved by evaluating the statistical similarity between the height 
distributions of the genuine and clone devices. 
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